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32


THE LIBERTARIAN ENTERPRISE
Number 32, August 1, 1997

The Only "Dangerous Wwapon" is the Human Mind, II

By Tom Creasing
hobbit@aminet.co.kr

Exclusive to The Libertarian Enterprise

         In regard to my debut piece in The Libertarian Enterprise, V.S. in Nevada wrote:
          "[T]his thing reads like Part I.' Now, I'm waiting for: Part II: If I'd been in charge of the church at Waco, and I expected a federal assault, here's what I would have done.'"
         I don't have my dictionary of quotations to hand, but as I recall some strategist once pointed out that battles and wars aren't won by one side, they're lost by the other. In other words, he who gives up first is the loser. The essence of war, then, is to schedule and apply your resources so that the other side gives up first. It is difficult to say exactly what resources victims at Waco might have had, or what resources other intended victims might have, but for purposes of this brief overview I will consider only those that they were demonstrated to have or which would have been easily available.
         Scheduling (or strategy) consists of long range and short range aspects, and a good scheduler takes both of those into account. During the long range scheduling period you determine general considerations (e.g. what you hope to accomplish, how you will go about it, what tools you will need, how to acquire or substitute for them, etc.). Short range strategy is that period of time after one of the instances identified in your long range phase has manifested itself, and now you begin tailoring your response and preparing applications. Applications are, of course, the active conduct of your strategies.
         My previous article covered what I believed to be major failings in the Waco victims' long range strategies. They demonstrably hadn't really identified and considered their purposes, beyond establishing an odd lifestyle, their acquisition of tools was haphazard and poorly thought out, they had no prepared contingency plans beyond hunker down and hope they'll go away, and their performance did not live up to their advertising. As with many other things in life, they should have solved this problem while it was small.
         We've already touched on many of the long range scheduling errors they made. One that I hadn't mentioned was a failure to stockpile other tools, including a broader variety of communications equipment. Ceding their attackers control of the information flow was an inexcusable error, both in the short range scheduling and application phases.
         In the short range scheduling block, V.S. covered what he believed they should have done, and here, lightly edited, is his exceedingly well considered view:

         "Call the ATF. Ask if they're planning to come serve a search warrant. Volunteer to arrange a meeting time for two agents to come out. Once they've said they have no interest, inform them this entire conversation is being recorded. Ask them again if they'd like to come out for a peaceful tour and cup of coffee. Tell them copies of this tape will be going to the local sheriff, your lawyer, and the local TV station, as evidence that you're willing to bend over backwards to comply with the law. Ask them if there's anything else bothering them."

         Tool time. Video cameras are a must in this modern TV addicted age. People don't want to hear recordings with some still photo up in the corner. They will be much more interested in someone sitting calmly at a desk, talking to ATF agents on a speaker phone and covering all the bases V.S. mentions. A couple of highly visible kids ("Say hi to the nice ATF man, sweetie.") obviously at ease in their surroundings wouldn't hurt, either.
         Another set of tools would be ham radios and CBs, especially if the former incorporate Slow Scan TV capabilities, all the better to get your pictures to the networks and public at large. Cell phones, especially if hooked up to computers and thence to the Internet, would also fit into this information category. Remember that the First Amendment is first for a reason -- timely information (or the control thereof) can be worth crates of ammunition and bundles of rifles. Loudspeakers can be a good investment as well, as we'll see in applications.
         Yet another tool is personal connections. The more friends and associates you have, the greater the number of people who will raise a fuss in the media if you're assaulted, the better off you are. These are also people who can help get out information and videos to other sources to ensure maximum exposure. Yes, there may be something attractive about the self sufficient exile from society lifestyle -- but you can see where that got Randy Weaver.
         V.S. goes on to point out, with obvious skill:

         Only then might one want to talk about digging flanking, communicating trenches, digging pits or erecting concrete barricades in the driveway and to protect internal living quarters, maintaining a constant, rotating, long-range scout-sniper patrol with orders to locate and take out enemy command and communication facilities upon the sound of any full-scale armed engagement from their rear, the relative merits of 12-gauge buckshot as opposed to black-tip 30.06, etc.

         The government has said, over and over again, that the ATF clowns at Waco were "ambushed." Wouldn't it be interesting to even do Part II as an interview? Call two military gents with some experience at "ambush," which is a fairly specific military term. Like, maybe, SEALS. Give them a scenario: you know 70 enemy troops, well-equipped (including hot, bulky Kevlar) but not very well trained, and without much real esprit de corps, are going to be piling out of a cattle trailer in broad daylight sometime soon, rushing your front door and erecting scaling ladders. Here's the manpower and weaponry you have available. Draw up a plan which -- with 30 minutes notice -- will result in maximum enemy casualties, and minimal friendly losses. Estimate enemy casualties after 90 minutes.
         Suggesting this particular analysis has merit, although there are plenty of books out there that will provide far more depth and detail than we would want use in this limited space available here. Additionally, in the seamless web of things, I would have little difficulty, given 30 minutes warning and the Waco victims resources, organizing an ambush that would guarantee, as close as is humanly possible, 100% casualties in the advancing light infantry unit. What, though, do you do about the mechanized infantry and armor units that follow? Seems like we're back to long range scheduling again, and yet more planning required.


Thomas J. Creasing is an attorney for the Young Wha Consulting Corporation Korea Press Center, 8th Fl. 25, 1-Ka, Taepyung-Ro Chung-Ku, Seoul, Korea 100-745. Short Address: KPO Box 106, Seoul 110-601, Korea. Direct Line: +82 (2) 3700-6881. Fax: +82 (2) 738-2538. E-mail: hobbit@aminet.co.kr


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